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Abstract: Unlike practices in electrical and mechanical equipment engineering, 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) do not have a set of standardized and harmo-
nized practices for assurance and certification that ensures safe, secure and reli-
able operation with typical software and hardware architectures. This paper pre-
sents a recent initiative called AMASS (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and 
Seamless Assurance and Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems) to promote 
harmonization, reuse and automation of labour-intensive certification-oriented 
activities via using model-based approaches and incremental techniques. 
AMASS will develop an integrated and holistic approach, a supporting tool 
ecosystem and a self-sustainable community for assurance and certification of 
CPS. The approach will be driven by architectural decisions (fully compatible 
with standards, e.g. AUTOSAR and IMA), including multiple assurance con-
cerns such as safety, security and reliability. AMASS will support seamless in-
teroperability between assurance/certification and engineering activities along 
with third-party activities (external assessments, supplier assurance). The ulti-
mate aim is to lower certification costs in face of rapidly changing product fea-
tures and market needs.  
Keywords: Assurance, Safety, Security, Certification, System Architecture, Re-
use, seamless Interoperability 
1 Introduction  
Embedded systems have significantly increased in number, technical complexity, and 
sophistication toward open, interconnected, networked systems (such as "the connect-
ed car"). This has brought a “cyber-physical” dimension with it, exacerbating the 
problem of assuring safety, security and reliability in the presence of human, envi-
ronmental and technological risks. Furthermore, the products into which these Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS) are integrated (e.g. aircrafts) need to respect applicable 
standards for assurance and in some areas they even need certification. 
Unlike practices in electrical and mechanical equipment engineering, CPS do not 
have a set of standardized and harmonized practices for assurance and certification 
that ensures safe, secure and reliable operation with typical software and hardware 
architectures. As a result, the CPS community often finds it difficult to apply existing 
certification guidance. Ultimately, the pace of assurance and certification will be de-
termined by the ability of industry and the certification and assessment authorities to 
overcome technical, regulatory, and operational challenges. Another key difficulty 
appears when trying to reuse CPS products between projects and even from one ap-
plication domain to another. Product evolutions become costly and time consuming 
because they entail regenerating the entire body of evidence or their certification can 
be constrained by different standards. This may imply that the full assurance and cer-
tification process is applied as for a new product, thus reducing the return on invest-
ment of such reuse decision. 
This paper presents a recent initiative called AMASS (Architecture-driven, Multi-
concern and Seamless Assurance and Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems) [1] to 
promote harmonization, reuse and automation of labour-intensive certification-
oriented activities via using model-based approaches and incremental techniques. 
Section 2 describes the main challenges faced by AMASS in the light of current state 
of the art and Section 3 summarizes the proposed directions to solve those challenges. 
2 Current state and challenges  
AMASS builds upon two large-scale past projects, OPENCOSS [2] and SafeCer [3], 
which dealt with the problem of certification of safety-critical systems in multiple 
domains using model-based approaches and incremental techniques. Among the main 
targeted tangible results, AMASS will produce a Reference Tool Architecture 
(ARTA). The ARTA (Fig. 1) represents a virtual entity that embodies a common set 
of tool interfaces/adaptors, working methods, tool usage methodologies and protocols 
that will allow any stakeholder of the assurance and certification/qualification activi-
ties to seamless integrate their activities (e.g., product engineering, exter-
nal/independent assessment, component/parts supply) into tool chains adapted to the 
specific needs of the targeted CPS markets, such as industrial automation, automotive, 
space, railway, avionics or air traffic management. 
Figure 1 also shows the AMASS Platform Basic Building Blocks, which are the re-
sult of merging existing technologies from OPENCOSS and SafeCer. These building 
blocks include tools for specification of system components, specification of assur-
ance cases as structured argumentation trees, evidence management, and compliance 
management. In addition to these, the basic building blocks include user access man-
agement and data management tools, as well as the Common Assurance and Certifica-
tion Metamodel (CACM). CACM is an evolution of the OPENCOSS and SafeCer 
metamodels. Using a common metamodel for different application domains and as-
surance activities will also enable management of assurance/certification assets in a 
common format, sharing patterns of technology and architecture, and cost-effective 
reuse between different domains and standard frameworks. 
Supported on the basic building blocks, AMASS will work on four pillars, which 
corresponds to specific challenges and Scientific and Technical Objectives (STO): 
• Architecture-Driven Assurance. The standard architectures (such as AUTOSAR 
in the automotive industry and IMA in avionics) needed to handle these new large, 
networked systems are only now being equipped with mechanisms to handle de-
pendability-related aspects. OPENCOSS and SafeCer approaches are agnostic re-
garding system architectural and engineering choices. This is an intentional feature 
to meet key requirements about cross-domain harmonization and flexibility. The 
architecture-agnostic approach is in the right direction since it permits to bench-
mark industrial case studies and demonstrate the feasibility of using a common 
framework for multiple application domains. However, the need for more cohe-
sively integrated approaches (assurance/certification versus engineering activities) 
requires further research and industrial validation with standard and modern engi-
neering practices (e.g., AUTOSAR-driven model-based development). 
• Multi-Concern Assurance. OPENCOSS and SafeCer were oriented to safety 
aspects. The synergies between safety and security (among other dependability 
properties) seem to offer clear opportunities for the reuse of assurance assets, alt-
hough prior research in this area has suggested that the domain-specific standards 
do not always support such reuse. Also, the contract-based approaches to composi-
tional assurance developed in OPENCOSS and SafeCer depend, in some respects, 
on precise mechanisms associated with safety characteristics. There is a need to re-
fine this approach to support the management of trade-offs between various system 
characteristics (including safety, security, reliability and the like). 
• Seamless Interoperability. Providing a seamless interoperability between assur-
ance/certification activities and engineering activities (e.g., design, implementa-
tion, validation and verification- V&V), along with third-party activities (e.g., ex-
ternal assessments and supplier assurance) is of prime importance to lower the 
threshold of product assurance and certification in face of rapidly changing product 
features and market needs. The challenge is to be able to gather evidence from dif-
ferent types of tools by means of standardized and well-defined adapters or ex-
change tools. 
• Cross and Intra-Domain Reuse. The OPENCOSS and SafeCer approaches aim to 
reduce the assurance effort when reusing products, by promoting flexible and sys-
tematic reuse approaches that are fully cognizant of the similarities and differences 
between approaches to safety assurance across the main safety-critical system do-
mains. While these approaches are a first proof of concept of cross- as well as in-
tra-domain reuse and many safety-critical industries are convinced of the benefits 
to share some development with other industries, one obstacle to the cost-effective 
reuse of cross-domain assets is the fact that the terminology and semantics used to 
describe and manage assurance across different application domains are not con-
sistent. 
 Fig. 1. AMASS High-level Tool Architecture 
3 Approaches 
3.1 Architecture-Driven Assurance 
The architecture represents a major aspect for ensuring dependability of a CPS and for 
meeting assurance and certification needs and requirements. It describes the realiza-
tion of the system and consists of the components and all the mechanisms necessary 
to fulfill, among others, safety, security, reliability, and availability requirements.  
The architecture components shall have specific dependability characteristics. 
These characteristics impose constraints on component reuse, that can refer to both 
technical aspects (e.g., a component can only be deemed safe for a given operational 
context) and economical (e.g., component reuse will have an impact on CPS cost). In 
addition a CPS’ architecture must conform to the applicable standards so that a sys-
tem can be effectively certified according to them.  
The AMASS architecture-driven reuse will build on the results of the OPENCOSS 
and SafeCer projects, and address the additional architecture-related features that can 
greatly increase the opportunities of cost reduction and of reuse for CPSs, as well as 
facilitate the analysis for  assurance and certification.  
System Architecture Modelling for Assurance. Architecture-driven reuse will build 
on the component model and contract-based verification facilities developed in the 
SafeCer project. The OPENCOSS CCL metamodel for assurance will be extended 
with a more detailed formalism for the definition of the system architecture and for 
analysis of the system dependability with the inclusion of the SafeCer component and 
contract models, enriched with "white box" information (e.g., fault, error, and failure), 
“black-box” annotations, and all the other concepts that would allow to improve the 
analysis of all the aspects that affect assurance activities. 
We plan to study the relation of the OPENCOSS and SafeCer assurance models 
with different system modelling languages (e.g. UML, SysML, AADL, EAST-ADL, 
etc.), safety modelling profiles, and specific platform models and architectures like 
AUTOSAR for automotive and IMA for avionics. A finer-grained analysis of a CPS 
and its assurance and certification information will allow industry to make more in-
formed decisions regarding what can be reused between systems (including different 
versions of systems) and reuse consequences. 
Assurance Patterns Library Management. OPENCOSS and SafeCer have straight-
forward mechanisms to specify assurance patterns for argumentation and for compli-
ance with standards. However, further research and case studies are necessary to co-
hesively integrate these patterns in specific assurance and certification activities. This 
includes safety/security architectural patterns definition and application (e.g. 3-level-
monitoring, E2E protection, and partitioning, among others), and auto-generation of 
platform models and configurations based on these patterns (e.g. for AUTOSAR and 
IMA). The use of patterns speeds architecture specification and facilitates the (re)use 
of components, especially if developed to be used in such patterns. Moreover, it ena-
bles the reuse of models and associated analysis results, e.g. guarantees of tolerance 
on failure communication associated with E2E protection [4] or security-related non-
interference associated with partitioning [5]. 
Assurance of specific technologies. AMASS will consider technology trends such 
as the use of new multi-core hardware platforms, the introduction of middleware solu-
tions (such as AUTOSAR in the automotive domain), deterministic communication 
technologies, and new networked functionalities such as remote diagnosis, software 
upgrading, towards vehicle and aircraft autonomy. Since OPENCOSS and SafeCer 
results are technology-agnostic, they do not directly support the assurance and certifi-
cation of many characteristics of the new technologies for CPS. However, these char-
acteristics have a great impact on how CPS assurance and certification has to be man-
aged for highly-critical CPSs. Therefore, the characteristics thus must be carefully 
taken into account as part of the technology patterns, and benchmarked in case studies 
to determine the circumstances under which they can be reused, assured, and certified. 
Contract-Based Assurance Composition. The concepts of contracts in OPENCOSS 
and SafeCer will be integrated in AMASS. In particular, the AMASS approach for the 
argumentation that a system architecture is compliant with the system properties will 
follow the contract refinement defined in the system model. Therefore, the guarantees 
of the system will be ensured by the composition of the components contracts, while 
the assumptions of a component will be ensured by the context provided by the sys-
tem architecture. In case contracts are specified and analyzed with formal methods, 
evidence for the contracts refinement argument will be provided by verification tools 
such OCRA [6], developed in the SafeCer project. Safety analyses based on the con-
tract specification will enrich the assurance case with fault trees showing the depend-
ency of system failures on the component failures. 
V&V-based Assurance Impact Assessment. Automatic V&V-oriented techniques 
will enrich the OPENCOSS and SafeCer assurance approaches. These techniques 
include  automated search of compliant arguments in a set of components to define a 
new safe application that conforms to a set of safety/security requirements, search of 
adequate component candidates for a project (e.g. in railway: segregated safety con-
troller, reduce footprint of hardware, safe communication protocol) starting with sev-
eral functional and safety requirements (or safety patterns),  formal techniques to 
validate that the requirements specification is complete, correct, and unambiguous, 
and  automated support of  assurance decisions by provision of what-if scenarios 
when changing any engineering feature. 
3.2 Multi-Concern Assurance 
The OPENCOSS project has developed an approach for mapping safety assurance 
artefacts, techniques and requirements across domains, using the OPENCOSS CCL, 
to resolve the inconsistencies in terminology across the target domains and to support 
informed reuse of assurance assets. Also, the compositional certification approaches 
developed in OPENCOSS and in SafeCer further support reuse by encapsulating as-
surance concerns for individual components into reusable assurance argument mod-
ules and by providing a mechanism to configure these modules to form an overall 
system assurance case. In order to fully leverage the benefits of development method-
ologies based on the informed reuse of components, however, it is important to con-
sider other aspects of the system’s design as part of the assurance framework: charac-
teristics such as reliability, availability, maintainability, durability, performance and 
security also have an impact on safety, and need to be considered in the assurance of 
critical CPS. 
In the AMASS project, we aim to exploit the existing OPENCOSS and SafeCer 
approaches and extend them to provide a tool-supported methodology for the devel-
opment of assurance cases which address multiple system characteristics.  There are 
three aspects to this work. 
Dependability Assurance Modeling. The OPENCOSS CCL metamodel is relatively 
generic, and its extension to support the reuse of assurance data relating to other de-
pendability-related requires considerable further domain modelling, but no fundamen-
tal re-engineering of the approach.  Similarly, the CCL vocabulary will require the 
addition of further concepts, but the vocabulary-based and model-based techniques 
for using mappings between concepts are readily transferable. From a methodological 
point of view, the SafeCer Safety-oriented Process Line Engineering remains valid. 
However, its modeling means may require to be extended (through the AMASS 
CACM metamodel) to explicitly address additional dependability-related attributes  . 
Contract-Based Multi-concern Assurance. The contract-based approaches to com-
positional certification developed in OPENCOSS and SafeCer depend, in some re-
spects, on precise mechanisms associated with safety characteristics. AMASS propos-
es to refine this approach to support the management of trade-offs between system 
characteristics. 
System Dependability Co-Analysis/Assessment. The synergies between safety and 
security (among other dependability properties) seem to offer clear opportunities for 
the reuse of assurance assets, although prior research in this area has suggested that 
the domain-specific standards do not always support such reuse [7]. The AMASS 
project will focus initially on extending the OPENCOSS and SafeCer approaches to 
address those aspects of security which impact on safety issues for critical CPS, 
where the potential to save costs through reuse is high. The project will then integrate 
and extend existing architecture-driven approaches to the assurance of system and 
security, such as the D-MILS approach [8], where the system architecture is the key 
element for hinging the assurance of both safety and security aspects such as parti-
tioning and redundancies, or the SESAMO [9] component-oriented design methodol-
ogy, based on model-driven technology and jointly addressing safety and security 
aspects and their interrelation for networked embedded systems in multiple domains. 
The interplay between security and safety will also be considered in terms of process 
requirements. The recently introduced notion of Security-informed Safety-oriented 
Process Line [10] will be further investigated in AMASS in order to enable the 
alignment of safety and security standards. 
3.3 Seamless Interoperability 
This area aims at guaranteeing the interoperability of the AMASS tool framework 
with other tools used in the lifecycle of CPS, such as design and V&V tools, whereby 
assurance evidence can be generated either manually or automatically by the tools 
themselves (code generators, testing tools, safety analysis tools, etc.). The challenge is 
to be able to gather evidence from different types of tools by means of standardized 
and well-defined adapters or exchange tools. There are some axes in this direction 
that can considerably improve the opportunities of AMASS adoption. 
Tool Integration Management. AMASS will deal with the problem that (1) assur-
ance information is present at each lifecycle phase (e.g. concept, design, implementa-
tion, and V&V) and (2) multiple different tools can be involved at each phase, so the 
AMASS tool framework needs to interwork with each of these tools. One promising 
approach is to use OSLC [11], by extending it to assurance aspects (safety, security, 
etc.). As part of this work, the AMASS consortium plans to reuse existing results 
from the Crystal (http://www.crystal-artemis.eu/) and MBAT projects 
(http://www.mbat-artemis.eu/) for OSLC-based tool interoperability, since many of 
their partners are also in AMASS. The data models for tool integration will be also 
part of the AMASS CACM metamodel. In addition, further assurance and certifica-
tion needs for the integrated information must be considered, e.g. traceability re-
quirements and analysis of information completeness and consistency according to 
the applicable standards. 
Collaborative Work Management. We mean supply chain and collaborative issues 
when developing, assuring and certifying CPS. AMASS needs to address aspects and 
needs such as DIA definition (ISO 26262 OEM-Supplier interaction definition), the 
development of a platform to exchange safety related information (potentially as 
cloud-based collaboration services, and private), issues related to information compo-
sition, versioning and update, security and scalability problems, and provision of 
server side services, e.g. intelligent search, cross project consistency checks. 
Tool Quality Assessment and Characterization. The engineering of CPS increas-
ingly relies on the use of tools that automate, replace, or supplement complex devel-
opment and V&V tasks. CPS safety can be compromised if the tools fail. To mitigate 
this risk, safety standards (e.g. DO-178C/DO330, IEC 61508, EN 501258, and ISO 
26262) define tool qualification processes, including tool characterization. Compli-
ance with these processes can be required for (re-)certification purposes, thus a sys-
tem supplier can need to collect information about tool qualification and to provide 
this information as assurance evidence for the overall system certification process. 
Within SafeCer, a tool qualification process line was investigated in order to reduce 
time and cost via reuse. Within AMASS, this exploratory work will be deepened and 
broadened to consider also AMASS-related tool-chains.   
3.4 Cross/Intra-Domain Reuse: the ubiquitous need for reuse 
The higher complexity and size of CPS products combined with the growing market 
demand requires the industry to redefine its core and non-core activities, and to im-
plement a coherent and systematic reuse strategy instead of relying exclusively on in-
house-developed applications. For example, if the engine control computer from the 
automotive industry is to be reused in aerospace industry, the full certification process 
is applied as for a new product, thus reducing the return on investment of such deci-
sion. In such circumstances, systematic cross-domain reuse would be crucial to reduce 
the cost of re-certification. In circumstances where a new version of a product comes 
from a previously certified version of that same product, systematic intra-domain 
reuse would be crucial. Systematic intra-domain reuse would also be crucial in case of 
incremental certification (e.g., from a generic product to a specific one, obtained via 
addition of functionalities). 
The OPENCOSS and SafeCer approaches aimed to reduce much of this repeated 
assurance effort, by promoting a flexible and systematic reuse approach that is fully 
cognizant of the similarities and differences between approaches to safety assurance 
across the main safety-critical system domains. In particular, on the one hand the CCL 
allows OPENCOSS tool users to model “equivalence maps” between different stand-
ards and regulations (including intra- and cross-domain) in order to facilitate reuse 
decisions between assurance projects from different application domains. On the other 
hand, safety-oriented process lines allow users to model process commonality and 
variability enabling systematic reuse. 
While these approaches are a first proof of concept of cross- as well as intra-
domain reuse and many safety-critical industries are convinced of the benefits to 
share some development with other industries, it first and foremost requires a com-
mon and strongly validated assurance and certification platform. This way, the certifi-
cation results for a system or component originally developed for a different domain 
or for a different criticality level can be carried over to other domains. Also, a number 
of open technical aspects need further research: 
Semantic Standards Equivalence Mapping. One obstacle to the cost-effective reuse 
of cross-domain assets is the fact that the terminology and semantics used to describe 
and manage assurance across different application domains are not consistent. For 
example, there is some degree of overlap between concepts such as ‘fault’, ‘hazard’ 
and ‘mishap’ and what constitutes a ‘component’ or a ‘subsystem’, but there are also 
gaps between the definitions of these concepts across the standards. OPENCOSS 
started to solve this issue by using the CCL Vocabulary approach. The CCL Vocabu-
lary is a structured and harmonised way to store and communicate knowledge about 
assurance artefacts and concerns. However, no complex, real cases were explored 
with this approach.  Within SafeCer, an ontology-based method for process elements 
reuse was explored [12]. AMASS shall extend the CCL Vocabulary (though the 
AMASS CACM metamodel) approach by automating its creation and usage via deep-
ened usage of the SafeCer ontology-based method. An automated CCL Vocabulary 
approach will also allow us to perform informed gap analysis on the standards and 
mitigate against the danger of inappropriate reuse where a given assurance asset does 
not appropriately match the requirements of the reuse context. 
Cross-concern Reuse. In addition to mappings between standards related to the 
same concern, we need to identify mappings between standards that focus on different 
concerns in order to enable cross-concern reuse. It is well known for instance that the 
safety and security communities could be merged within a unified terminological 
framework under the dependability umbrella. This potential merge could foster the 
identification of commonalities and thus reusable artefacts. 
Reuse Assistant (Cross/Intra-Domain). In addition to semantic mappings, we need 
to understand how the concepts work in terms of their relationship with one another to 
define the objectives of the standards – i.e. the intent which informs requirements and 
process activities, and the artefacts they result in -, in order to come to a clearer un-
derstanding of the role played by each activity and artefact in the overall assurance 
effort. AMASS will support users to understand whether reuse of the assurance assets 
is reasonable or determine what further analysis is required to justify claims of com-
pliance. For example, AMASS will provide tool assistance to highlight the reasons 
why fault analysis is performed and the point in the development of the system at 
which it is applied (and hence the degree of detail involved). The compositional ar-
gument approach developed by SafeCer and OPENCOSS will evolve to get the ability 
to characterise pre-existing argument modules in terms of the intent of the applicable 
standards. This characterisation will rely on a clear understanding and statement of 
the assurance objectives of each standard, and of the assurance assets used to evince 
the claims made to demonstrate their satisfaction. 
Product/Process/Assurance Case Line Specification. Variability management cre-
ates a pain in the industry. Various methods have been developed to manage variabil-
ity and thus relieve industry from such a pain. For software, subversion and git are 
already an improvement to manage variability due to product evolution. Subversion, 
however, does not satisfy the management of all sources of variability. A systematic 
approach is needed to deal with software/hardware variability management, but also 
process and assurance case-related variability. The AMASS project will focus on 
extending and integrating the current methods in order to manage for instance ripple-
effects that changes on product requirements might have on processes as well as as-
surance cases. The objective is to promote a fully integrated approach addressing the 
fundamental dimensions for certification purposes. 
4 Conclusion  
Despite the wide adoption of the concept of cyber-physical systems (CPS), its en-
trance in critical domains such as automotive, medical or aerospace is not advancing 
at the pace that the designers and producers would want in order to exploit the many 
benefits brought to these domains. While CPS can more efficiently react to changing 
requirements and adapt to different environments, these properties are challenging for 
the adoption in critical domains. Connectivity and complexity introduce new risks and 
extend potential risk causes towards security threats. 
The validation and certification of the new-implemented solutions is the main bar-
rier preventing this adoption. Critical domains present a long tradition of certification 
procedures and standards since the very early stages of software and systems engi-
neering history. Unfortunately, this long history translates into complex validation 
procedures that require extensive testing and long certification campaigns, increasing 
the associated costs and preventing fast adoption of new concepts. In addition due to 
the isolation of critical systems validation, the certification focus was mainly restrict-
ed to safety and not threats from malicious causes. Furthermore, the increase in the 
complexity of the systems has been handled by extending exponentially the validation 
test campaigns. 
The AMASS project brings a new vision into these assurance and certification pro-
cedures where extensive testing and validation and black box models are replaced by 
an intelligent approach based on the underlying architecture of the CPS system. The 
procedures will profit not only from previous certification results of pre-existing 
modules, but also from equivalent or similar architectures already validated. 
This process of learning from similar architectures is performed more or less un-
consciously by all the designers during early architectural design phases. All the de-
signers and companies rely on a series of architectures that are well known “to work 
properly”. AMASS project will provide a systematic methodology and tooling to pass 
from this qualitative and intuitive approach into a formal validation procedure where 
the underlying architecture of the CPS to be certified plays a key role in defining and 
executing the validation process. AMASS will extend this approach to architectures 
with inherent safety and security properties. AMASS will bridge between safety and 
security validation and certification, and ease both. 
AMASS will shape this approach in a complete toolset that will integrate all the 
experience and developments of previous projects such as OPENCOSS and SafeCer 
and extend it towards cybersecurity.  The AMASS approach should allow to handle 
the changing system security over the product lifetime. A safe system is designed 
once and is not changed over the product lifetime. A secure system can change mas-
sively due to e.g. software updates and therefore also the security has to be ensured in 
these changing lifetime process. This toolset approach is a key element in the impact 
strategy, as it will reduce dramatically the entry barriers of new actors in the CPS 
business by providing them with a consistent and easy-to-use validation toolset that 
shall reduce their learning curves and increase their chances to perform a “right-first-
time” validation of new CPS architectures.  
To obtain the maximum impact from this new approach it is necessary that the 
proposed methodologies and tooling are perfectly aligned with both the industrial 
validation procedures and standards, and with the emerging architectures derived 
from cutting edge cyber-physical systems. Here is where the full potential of AMASS 
will develop. The project includes the complete value chain of actors involved in CPS 
validation procedures, from tool providers to industrial end users, including top-notch 
technological providers. This allows AMASS to identify the most commonly used 
architectures and those new emerging ones identified by the industry as the most 
promising ones, adapting the tools and procedures to them and therefore guaranteeing 
the applicability of the results in the domains included in the project, as well as easing 
its fast extension into those domains not included in the project. 
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